People’s mandate empowered Bangabandhu

The night of 25 March 1971 changed everything, when the Pakistan army launched a genocide on the Bangali people. Prior to that, the public mindset had undergone a strong change when Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman delivered his fiery speech 7 March that year. And the speech has been listened to and analysed endlessly since then.

It would be wrong to look at 7 March in isolation. There is an extensive background leading up to it. We have to go further back to understand how the ties between the two wings of Pakistan loosened and ultimately snapped. That will enable us to understand the context, inevitability and significance of 7 March.

An unfolding on various incidents led up to 7 March. Had 1 March not taken place, 7 March wouldn’t have happened. At 1:00 in the afternoon of 1 March, it had been announced over the radio that the general assembly session has been suspended. The recorded message was in president Yahya Khan’s name, but it was not in his voice. The message said that there needed to be adequate representation of both East and West Pakistan for a fair and effective rule and that the political leaders needed to be given more time.

The US consulate general in Dhaka, Archer Blood sent a message to Washington, saying, after the suspension of the national assembly session being announced, the chances of an understanding are 0:100.

That means there was a background to 1 March too. Sheikh Mujib has already announced that he would not compromise on the six-point demand, that is, on full regional autonomy. This was not acceptable to the West Pakistan leader Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and military ruler Yahya Khan. Yahya Khan has expected Mujib to amend the six points, but by mid-February he saw that this was not to be so.

Bhutto was unwilling to be the opposition leader. On 20-21 February, at a meeting in Karachi, he decided that they would not join the coming session of the national assembly. He told the East Pakistan governor SM Ahsan and the martial law commander of the eastern command Sahabzada Yaqub Khan that Mujib should be informed of the general assembly suspension on 28 February, not before or after that. Sheikh Mujib met with Ahsan, Yaqub and Rao Farman Ali on 28 February at the Governor’s House in Dhaka. He was agitated when he heard the decision. He said if the general assembly was to be postponed, then a new date should be announced at the same time too, then he would be able to keep the situation in control.

Sheikh Mujib understood things were going out of control. The youth of the country and within the party were vying for independence. On 28 February, the US ambassador Joseph Farley called upon Sheikh Mujib at his Dhanmondi house. Mujib told him that he had spent many years in jail in Pakistan. If the country’s unity could not be upheld, he wouldn’t hesitate to face the bullets. Even if he was taken to jail again, or even cut up into little pieces, he would not stand back from the mandate that the people had placed upon him. He didn’t want separation, he wanted a confederation where Bangladesh would get its rightful dues. All this is visible in the messages sent by the US ambassador from Dhaka to Washington. It was that afternoon that Bhutto declared that he would dislocate the country from Khyber to Karachi is the national assembly session was not suspended.

Sheikh Mujib was a seasoned politician. He could read the people’s minds and was aware of the activities going on around him. Information came in to him through various channels.

At the beginning of February, in a meeting with his party leaders, Sheikh Mujib had considered the possibility of declaring independence. He and Tajuddin Ahmed carefully considered what steps would have to be taken to make this declaration. Kamal Hossain said he was given the responsibility to draw up a draft of this declaration of independence and did so in consultation with Tajuddin. Reference was made to the American declaration of independence where the injustice of the British rule had been mentioned. Kamal Hossain said he worked for two days with Tajuddin by his side at his Sharif Mansion office in Motijheel. He typed the declaration himself. He handed it over to Sheikh Mujib on 10 February and he kept it away. On 13 February morning the president announced that general assembly session would open on 3 March ad so the matter was kept aside.

On 1 March when they heard that the assembly had been suspended, thousands of people took to the streets. The people spontaneously declared independence and set fire to the Pakistan flag. On 3 March Chhatra League hoisted the flag of independent Bangladesh at Dhaka University. On 3 March at Paltan, in presence of Sheikh Mujib, Chhatra League declared the independence manifesto. And for the first time, in the proposal issued at the meeting, the term ‘father of the nation’ was placed before Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujib’s name. The people had arisen. Sheikh Mujib called for a non-violent non-cooperation movement. He said that he would speak out on 7 March.

On 6 March Sheikh Mujib held a meeting with the senior leaders of his party. They included Tajuddin Ahmed, Syed Nazrul Islam, Khandkar Mushtaque Ahmed, M Mansur Ali, Qamaruzzman and Kamal Hossain. It was said that if independence was directly announced, this would give the military a chance to crackdown. This was to be avoided. Pressure was to be kept up on Yahya so that he handed power over to the people’s representatives.

On the evening of 6 March, Sheikh Mujib and Yahya spoke over the phone. Yahya requested Mujib not to do anything that would take things to a point of no return.

The 7 March public meeting had already been scheduled. There had been much thought over what Mujib would say that day. He was the sole speaker at the largest public gathering ever the country. During his 19 minute speech he spoke about the prevailing situation and its background, the conspiracy brewing about handing over power and the army’s shooting unarmed people. He gave four conditions to joining the general assembly on the new date fixed for 25 March. These included that martial law would have to be withdrawn, the armed forces would have to return to the barracks, an inquiry would have to be made into the firing on the people, and power would have to be handed over the elected representatives. He did not directly announce independence, but called for every house to be made into a fort and for all to come forward with whatever they had to resist the enemy. He said that this time the struggle was for freedom, for independence. What he did not say at the meeting was as important as what he said.

Sheikh Mujib was aware of the consequences. He was prepared. He did not want to close negotiations. He wanted that matter to be resolved through an announcement of the military authorities. In an interview with David Frost in Dhaka in January 1972, he said I wanted them to attack first.

Like any other common politician, he could have publicly announced independence and many had wanted him to do so. But the huge public mandate had empowered him with a responsibility. This was reflected in his 7 March speech. He wanted a negotiated settlement. But that was not to be. The military junta forced a war upon us.